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Abstract—In this paper, we show how practical the little
theorem of witness functions is in detecting security flaws in
some category of cryptographic protocols. We convey a formal
analysis of the Needham-Schroeder symmetric-key protocol in
the theory of witness functions. We show how it helps to teach
about a security vulnerability in a given step of this protocol
where the value of security of a particular sensitive ticket
in a sent message unexpectedly plummets compared with its
value when received. This vulnerability may be exploited by an
intruder to mount a replay attack as described by Denning and
Sacco.
Index Terms—Security, Needham-Schroeder symmetric-key
protocol, witness functions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic protocols are distributed programs that
aim to secure communications in an unsecured network by
means of cryptography. They are used wherever the security
matters, for example, in electronic commerce, military
communications, electronic voting, etc. A security breach in
a protocol often causes significant and irreparable damage.
Indeed, a flaw in an online sales protocol can cause huge
losses for a remote seller. The victim, on the other hand, may
end up with a bad credit record and a tarnished reputation.
The use of cryptography, while necessary, cannot guarantee
the security of a protocol. Indeed, the history of protocols [1],
[2] teaches us that an intruder is capable of manipulating the
rules of a given protocol to infer a secret, usurp an identity,
alter the integrity of data or deny his participation in a given
communication after committing an unhealthy act.
Formal methods have therefore emerged [3]–[9] as a
preferred means of verifying whether a protocol meets the
security properties for which it was intended. As a result, a
number of methods have sprung up, and have demonstrated
distinct performance. Others were withdrawn after a period
of glory due to unfortunate deficiencies, several years after
their release.
In recent years, a new generation of analytical functions,
called witness functions [10]–[13], has been proposed to
analyze cryptographic protocols. These functions assign a
security value to each message component exchanged in
the protocol, then examine whether this value increases or
not between two reception-sending steps. If throughout the
protocol, all security values are observed increasing, then the
protocol itself is said to be increasing and hence declared
correct for the property of secrecy. If, on the other hand, a
decreasing value is found, these functions refuse to certify
the correctness of the protocol. This way of approaching
and handling security in cryptographic protocols stems from
the fact that increasing protocols are correct, proven in [11].
These functions have been a good way to demonstrate the
correctness of several protocols. They were also able to
teach about security vulnerabilities in other protocols. More
recently, in [14], the author proposed a reduced form of the
general theorem of protocol correctness by witness functions
[13] for analyzing tagged protocols. The author adopts a very
broad definition of tagged protocols and considers tagged any
protocol whose messages are distinguishable, one by one by
a receiving agent, either by inserting a particular syntactic
element in a message, or thanks to the position of identities
or nonces, or by any other means.
In this paper, we provide an analysis of the Needham-
Schroeder symmetric-key protocol [15] using this reduced
theorem that we refer to by the little theorem of witness
functions as opposed to the general theorem. We show that
this protocol does not respect this theorem and gets stuck
in a critical step in the protocol where a value of security
unexpectedly goes down which may be interpreted as a security
vulnerability. We also show that this latter can be exploited by
an intruder using a Denning and Sacco attack scenario [16].
II. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The paper is organized as follows:
• in Section III, we briefly present the role-based specifica-
tion in which a protocol is specified;
• in Section IV, we shortly review the foundation of witness
functions;
• in Section V, we present the little theorem of witness
functions;
• in Section VI, we give a formal analysis of the Needham-
Schroeder symmetric-key protocol using this theorem;
• in Section VII, we discuss the results of our analysis;
• in Section VIII, we compare our approach with other
related approaches;
• in Section IX, we conclude.
III. ROLE-BASED SPECIFICATION
A cryptographic protocol is a set of programs that can
communicate over the network. Each program corresponds
to a role of the protocol. Agents, who are actually servers
or people who can implement the protocol, can play several
roles simultaneously. When an honest agent takes on a role,
an instance of the program corresponding to the role runs
on the agent’s machine using its various personal data, for
example its identity and secret keys. A session is an instance
of a program executed by an agent. A dishonest agent, or
intruder [17], is not required to follow a protocol role. It
can execute any number of sessions. It has other capacities
like intercepting messages, concatenating or de-concatenating
messages, encrypting or decrypting messages with keys that
it knows, etc.
A role-based specification [18], [19] is an abstraction of
all these facts. It focuses on a single agent at a time and
represents what, how, and to/from whom it sends and receives
messages. If a component of a given message is not intelligible
for that agent, it is replaced by a variable. In that case, we talk
about generalized roles. An exponent is added to represent the
session.
IV. WITNESS FUNCTIONS
A. Reliable Function
Let’s consider the following function F :
Definition 1: (Reliable Function)
1. F (α, {α}) = ⊥
2. F (α,M1 ∪M2) = F (α,M1) ⊓ F (α,M2)
3. F (α,M) = ⊤, if α /∈ A(M)
4. F (α,m1.m2) = F (α, {m1,m2})
5. F (α, {m}k) = F (α, {m}), if pk−1q 6⊒ pαq
6. F (α, {m}k) = pk−1q ∪ ID(m), if pk−1q ⊒ pαq
A reliable function is a function that assigns to each atom
in a message a reasonable value of security. In the point 1.,
it assigns to a plain (clear) atomic message α the bottom
value of security (i.e. ⊥). In the point 2., it assigns for an
atomic message α that shows up in two sets of messages the
minimum (i.e. ⊓) of the two values calculated in each set
separately. In the point 3., it assigns to an atomic message
α that does not appear in a message (i.e. α /∈ A(M) where
A(M) is the set of all atoms of M ) the top value (i.e.
⊤). In the point 4., it assigns to an atomic message in a
concatenated message the minimum of the values calculated
in each message separately. In the point 5., F disregards
an encryption with an outer key of a lower level than the
analyzed atom (i.e. pk−1q 6⊒ pαq) and seeks a deeper strong
key. In the point 6., F first ensures that α is encrypted with a
key k of a higher level (i.e. pk−1q ⊒ pαq) and returns the set
of identities of agents that detain the reverse key (i.e. pk−1q)
in addition to the set of identities in the neighborhood of α
under the same encryption in m (i.e. ID(m)).
Example 1: Say that we have a context such that: pαq =
{A,B, S}; k−1ac = kac, k
−1
ab = kab, k
−1
as = kas; pkacq =
{A,C}, pkasq = {A,S}, pkabq = {A,B}. Say that m =
{{C.{E.α.D}kas}kab}kac .
F (α,m) = F (α, {{C.{E.α.D}kas}kab}kac)
{Definition 1, Point 5., since pk−1ac q 6⊒ pαq}
= F (α, {C.{E.α.D}kas}kab)
{Definition 1, Point 6.}
= pk−1ab q∪{E,C,D}
{Since pk−1ab q = {A,B} in the context}
= {A,B,E,C,D}
In [11], [13] we prove that F is reliable and we define other
reliable functions that we do not mention here.
B. Derivative Function
The function F given in Definition 1 does not deal with
variables. In order to do so, we rather use its derivative form
F ′. This derivative function simply removes all variables
around any evaluated atom before applying F . The following
example explains how to use F ′ to assign values of security
to atomic messages in messages containing variables.
Example 2: Let us have the same context as Example 1. Say
that m = {{C.{X.α.D}kas}kab}kac where X is a variable.
F ′(α,m) = F ′(α, {{C.{X.α.D}kas}kab}kac)
{The variable X is first removed by derivation, then F is applied}
= F (α, {{C.{α.D}kas}kab}kac)
{Definition 1, Point 5., since pk−1ac q 6⊒ pαq}
= F (α, {C.{α.D}kas}kab)
{Definition 1, Point 6.}
= pk−1ab q∪{C,D}
{Since pk−1ab q = {A,B} in the context}
= {A,B,C,D}
The derivative function F ′ is good for analyzing generalized
roles (involving messages with variables) in the case of tagged
protocols. However, it may present some complexities in the
general case, which is beyond the scope of this paper. In the
context of tagged protocols, F ′ is called witness function.
We recall that tagged protocols in our own definition are all
protocols that generate messages such that they are one by
one distinguishable from a receiver point of view, meaning,
no regular message can be unified with a non regular one.
p= 〈1, A −→ S : A.B.Na〉
〈2, S −→ A : {Na.kab.B.{kab.A}kbs}kas〉
〈3, A −→ B : {kab.A}kbs〉
〈4, B −→ A : {Nb}kab 〉
〈5, A −→ B : {Nb − 1}kab 〉
TABLE I
THE NEEDHAM-SCHROEDER SYMMETRIC-KEY PROTOCOL
V. LITTLE THEOREM OF WITNESS FUNCTIONS
Theorem 1: [Little Theorem of Witness Functions] Let p be
a tagged protocol. Let F ′ be a witness function. p is correct
for secrecy if: ∀R.r ∈ RG(p), ∀α ∈ A(r+) we have:
F ′(α, r+) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F ′(α,R−)
Theorem 1, which we call the little theorem of the witness
functions, uses the witness function F ′ to attribute a value
of security to every component in every single exchanged
message in the protocol, then, it examines if the value of
security of that component is increasing in the sent message
(i.e. in r+) compared with its value in either the context or
when it was received (i.e. in R−). If this is the case in all
the protocol steps, then the protocol is declared correct for
secrecy. Otherwise, the theorem refuses to certify the protocol
correctness and flags up a possible vulnerability that could
be exploited by an intruder. We will refer to this theorem by
LTWF in the following analysis of the Needham-Schroeder
symmetric key protocol.
VI. FORMAL ANALYSIS OF THE NEEDHAM-SCHROEDER
SYMMETRIC-KEY PROTOCOL
In this section, we analyze the Needham-Schroeder
symmetric-key protocol with Theorem 1 (LTWF) for secrecy.
This protocol is described in Table I and we refer to by p.
A. Context setting
The generalized roles of the protocol are RG(p) =
{AG ,BG ,SG} where:
AG = i.1 A −→ I(S) : A.B.N ia
i.2 I(S) −→ A : {N ia.X.B.Y }kas
i.3 A −→ I(B) : Y
i.4 I(B) −→ A : {Z}X
i.5 A −→ I(B) : {Z − 1}X
BG = j.1 I(A) −→ B : {T.A}kbs
j.2 B −→ I(A) : {N jb }T
j.3 I(A) −→ B : {N jb − 1}T
SG = n.1 I(A) −→ S : A.B.Q
n.2 S −→ I(A) : {Q.kab.B.{kab.A}kbs}kas
Context :
pAq = ⊥; pBq = ⊥; pSq = ⊥; (i.e. three public identities)
pNaq = ⊥ (i.e. public nonce);
pNbq = {A,B} (i.e. nonce shared between A and B);
pkabq = {A,B, S}; (i.e. session key shared between A and
B and created by S)
pkasq = {A,S}; (i.e. shared key between A and S)
pkbsq = {B,S}; (i.e. shared key between B and S)
(L,⊒,⊔,⊓,⊥,⊤) = (2I ,⊆,∩,∪, I, ∅); (i.e. security lattice)
I = {I, A,B, S}; (i.e. intruder and regular agents participating
in the protocol)
Xp = {X,Y, Z, T,Q} is the set of variables. F ′ is the used
witness function and the derivative function of F given in
Definition 1.
It is wise to notice that all the generated messages by the
protocol cannot overlap one with another from a receiver point
of view, which means that we can use Theorem LTWF to
analyze the protocol.
B. Analyzing the generalized role of A
From the generalized role AG , an agent A may participate
in three receiving/sending steps. In the first step, it receives
nothing and sends the message A.B.N ia. In the second step, it
receives the message {N ia.X.B.Y }kas and sends the message
Y . In the third step, it receives the message {Z}X and sends
the message {Z − 1}X . This is represented by the following
rules.
S1A :

A.B.N ia
; S2A :
{N ia.X.B.Y }kas
Y
; S3A :
{Z}X
{Z − 1}X
1) Analyzing exchanged messages in S1A:
1- For N ia:
a- On sending: r+
S1
A
= A.B.N ia
F ′(N ia, r
+
S1
A
) = F ′(N ia, A.B.N
i
a)
{No variable in the neighborhood of N ia to be removed by derivation}
= F (N ia, A.B.N
i
a)
{Definition 1 (no encryption)}
= ⊥ (1.1)
b- On receiving: R−
Si
= ∅
F ′(N ia, R
−
S1
A
) = F ′(N ia, ∅)
{No variable in the neighborhood of N ia to be removed by derivation}
= F (N ia, ∅)
{Definition 1}
= ⊤ (1.2)
2- Concordance with Theorem LTWF:
From 1.2 and since pNaq = {A,B}, we have:
pN iaq⊓F
′(N ia, R
−
S1
A
) = ⊥⊓⊤ = ⊥ (1.3)
From 1.1 and 1.3, we have :
F ′(N ia, r
+
S1
A
) ⊒ pN iaq ⊓ F
′(N ia, R
−
S1
A
) (1.4)
From 1.4, S1A respects Theorem LTWF. (I)
2) Analyzing exchanged messages in S2A:
1- For N ia:
a- On sending: r+
S2
A
= Y
F ′(N ia, r
+
S2
A
) = F ′(N ia, Y )
{The variable Y is removed by derivation}
= F (N ia, ∅)
{Definition 1}
= ⊤ (2.1)
b- On receiving: R−
S2
A
= {N ia.X.B.Y }kas
F ′(N ia, R
−
S2
A
) = F ′(N ia, {N
i
a.X.B.Y }kas)
{The variables X and Y are removed by derivation}
= F (N ia, {N
i
a.B}kas)
{Definition 1 and since pk−1as q = {A, S}}
= {A,S,B} (2.2)
2- For X :
c- On sending: r+
S2
A
= Y
F ′(X, r+
S2
A
) = F ′(X,Y )
{The variable Y is removed by derivation}
= F (X, ∅)
{Definition 1}
= ⊤ (2.3)
d- On receiving: R−
S2
A
= {N ia.X.B.Y }kas
F ′(X,R−
S2
A
) = F ′(X, {N ia.X.B.Y }kas)
{The variable Y is removed by derivation}
= F (X, {N ia.X.B}kas)
{Definition 1 and since pk−1as q = {A, S}}
= {A,S,B} (2.4)
3- For Y :
e- On sending: r+
S2
A
= Y
F ′(Y, r+
S2
A
) = F ′(Y, Y )
{Definition 1}
= ⊥ (2.5)
f- On receiving: R−
S2
A
= {N ia.X.B.Y }kas
F ′(Y,R−
S2
A
) = F ′(Y, {N ia.X.B.Y }kas)
{The variable X is removed by derivation}
= F (Y, {N ia.B.Y }kas)
{Definition 1 and since pk−1as q = {A, S}}
= {A,S,B} (2.6)
4- Concordance with Theorem LTWF:
From 2.1, 2.2, we have directly:
F ′(N ia, r
+
S2
A
) ⊒ pN iaq ⊓ F
′(N ia, R
−
S2
A
) (2.7)
From 2.3 and 2.4 we have directly:
F ′(X, r+
S2
A
) ⊒ pXq⊓ F ′(X,R−
S2
A
) (2.8)
However, from 2.5 and 2.6, we declare that:
F ′(Y, r+
S2
A
) 6⊒ pY q ⊓ F ′(Y,R−
S2
A
) (2.9)
since we have no idea about the variable Y , thus, we have no
idea about its value of security in the context (i.e. pY q ).
From 2.9, S2A does not respect Theorem LTWF. (II)
We abort our analysis here and we declare that the whole
protocol does not respect Theorem LTWF.
VII. DISCUSSION
In our analysis, we have clearly established in 2.9 that the
value of security of the variable Y (which is an abstraction
of the ticket {kab.A}kbs ) goes down between the step 2 and 3
of the protocol. At this point, our witness function refused to
certify the security of the protocol and flagged up a possible
attack. In other words, the witness function pointed out that
the variable Y could fall in an intruder hands who may
exploit it illegally, which is in tandem with the replay attack
presented by Denning and Sacco in [16]. In fact, suppose an
employee executing the first two steps of the protocol several
times as a regular agent A and collecting all the tickets
{kab.A}kbs , as well as the corresponding session keys kab. If
he is fired, as an external intruder I , he could still log on any
server B by playing the remaining steps of the protocol as
follows:
〈3, I(A) −→ B : {kab.A}kbs〉
〈4, B −→ I(A) : {Nb}kab〉
〈5, I(A) −→ B : {Nb − 1}kab〉
To sum up, the Needham-Schroeder symmetric-key protocol
neglected the fact that the tickets {kab.A}kbs is an important
component and allowed it to circulate in clear in the step 3,
which caused the described flaw to take place. This behavior is
strictly forbidden in an analysis using witness functions which
never allows any message component to have a non increasing
value of security even if it turns out that no actual flaw could
be found. However, we can understand that back to the time
when the protocol was designed, a few things were known
about protocols, and protocol designers mostly thought that
cryptography on its own was enough to ensure their security,
which turned out to be incorrect over time.
VIII. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK
The analysis of cryptographic protocols remains a constrain-
ing task [20] despite all the progress made in the field due
to the complexity and undecidability of the problem [21].
Witness functions, using the general theorem or the little
one, are beginning to gain ground and are proven to be a
powerful means of detecting security breaches or designing
correct protocols. They have outperformed other analytical
tools and methods such as interpretation functions [22], [23]
in terms of efficiency and accuracy [12]. The fact that these
functions allow a static analysis saves a lot of effort and time
compared to other dynamic methods based on Model-Checking
[24] or on program logics [25], for example. With that in mind,
neither the witness functions nor any other verification method
will deliver its optimal protocol protection if other dimensions
are neglected, especially security issues akin to the protocol
implementation and encryption primitive weaknesses of the
selected cryptographic system.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a detailed analysis of the
Needham-Schroeder symmetric-key protocol using the little
theorem of witness functions. We have proven its ability to help
detecting security vulnerabilities and inform about possible
flaws. In future work, we intend to address the problem of
compose protocols [26], [27] as well as E-voting protocols
[28]–[30] using these functions.
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NOTATIONS
pαq: initial value of security of an atomic message α in
a context of verification.
⊓: minimum operator (the union in the security Lattice)
⊒: greater than operator.
⊤: highest value in the security Lattice (top).
⊥: lowest value in the security Lattice (bottom).
r+: sent message in a generalized role.
R−: received message in a generalized role.
I: intruder; S: honest server; A,B, ...: principals.
Na: nonce belonging to A.
kab: key shared between A and B (and k
−1
ab its reverse
form).
A(m): set of all atoms of a message m.
AG : generalized role of an agent A.
RG(p): generalized roles of the protocol p.
A −→ B : m: A sending a message m to B.
I(A): intruder impersonating (playing the role of) an
agent A.
